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ARTICLE

A GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE FOR MEDICAL
COUNTER-MEASURE PREPAREDNESS
AGAINST BIOVIOLENCE
BARRY KELLMAN*
&
ZACHARY CLOPTON**
It’s time for a comprehensive effort to tackle bio-terror. We know that
the successful deployment of a biological weapon—whether it is sprayed
into our cities or spread through our food supply—could kill tens of
thousands of Americans and deal a crushing blow to our economy. Presidential Candidate Barack Obama (2008)a
[I]t is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be
used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. . . .
[T]errorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological
weapon than a nuclear weapon. . . . [T]he U.S. government needs to move
more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack. Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorismb
“[B]iological weapons are considered the least complicated and the
easiest to manufacture of all weapons of mass destruction.” “The destructive power of these [biological] weapons is no less than that of nuclear
weapons.” Quotations attributed to Al Qaedac
* President, International Security & Biopolicy Institute. Professor of Law and Director of
the International Weapons Control Center, DePaul University College of Law. With acknowledgements to Brent Davidson, Deputy to the President, International Security & Biopolicy Institute, JD
DePaul University, 2009.
** Former Senior Research Fellow, International Security & Biopolicy Institute, JD Harvard
Law School, 2007.
a
ScienceDebate2008.com, Barack Obama’s answers to the top 14 science questions facing
America (Aug. 30, 2008), http://www.sciencedebate2008.com/www/index.php?id=42.
b
COMM’N ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, WORLD AT
RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, at xv (2008), available at http://www.preventwmd.gov/report.
c
BARRY KELLMAN, BIOVIOLENCE—PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL TERROR AND CRIME 73
(2007) (citing al-Ma’asada al Jihadiya—The Jihadi Lion’s Den Website).
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In a world of incalculable dangers, there are fortunately only a few
ways that enemies could seriously subvert global security and stability. Of
these, bioviolence1
In a world of incalculable dangers, there are fortunately only a few
ways that enemies could seriously subvert global security and stability. Of
these, bioviolence2 is arguably among the most salient.
These dangers are emerging from the confluence of bioscientific capacities unimaginable only a few decades ago. No one should cast aspersions on this science. From bioscience’s labs emerge the promise of ridding
humanity of scourges that have afflicted our species since our predecessors
left Eden. Yet, biting the apple of knowledge has consequences, no matter
how benign scientists’ motives might be.
Their great achievements—understanding and manipulating life—inseparably carry the capacity to create weapons that could inflict catastrophe.
A lethal bioweapon could cause deaths or economic losses that exceed anything other than, perhaps, a nuclear weapon, yet it is much easier to make
than a nuclear weapon. The number of victims would depend on where an
attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the
weapon-maker; there is widespread expert consensus that a high-end attack
could produce in excess of ten thousand casualties, perhaps far more.s] The
extraordinary speed and spread of scientific development means that more
powerful and more diverse bioweapons are on the horizon.3
The stakes could not be more serious. Smallpox, humanity’s preeminent killer, was eradicated from nature—one of humanity’s greatest accomplishments. Remaining strains were secured in laboratories for research
purposes. However, scientists will soon (if not now) be able to synthesize it
by fusing genetic components. What if other orthopox viruses—monkeypox
or camelpox—can be manipulated to have grievous implications for
human-to-human transmission and rampant lethality? What if these innovative applications of bioscience can be made resistant to the vaccines and
therapeutics that are stockpiled against smallpox? In the wrong hands, how
many thousands, or potentially millions, of people would die? What would
be the ramifications for social order?
Diseases once thought to be eradicated and for which scant natural
immunity remains can be re-synthesized. The polio virus has been produced
1. Id. at 1 (“Bioviolence is the infliction of harm by the intentional manipulation of living
micro-organisms or their natural products for hostile purposes.”).
2. See Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Senior Scientist, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Testimony
Before the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.preventwmd.gov/9_10_08_margaret_
hamburg/.
3. According to the U.S. Defense Science Board in 2001, “major impediments to the development of biological weapons—strain availability, weaponization technology, and delivery technology—have been largely eliminated in the last decade by the rapid global spread of
biotechnology.” Id.
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from genetic precursors. Soon, it may be re-synthesized to be contagious
even among vaccinated populations. Consider genetic manipulation of measles—one of the great killers in human history—so that the immunizations
received in early childhood offer no protection. On the horizon is the specter of creating altogether new pathogens.
Various bacterial agents such as plague or tularemia could be altered to
increase their lethality or to evade antibiotic treatment. Scientists can generate antibiotic-resistant bacteria to determine how readily those bacteria
might become resistant to new treatments. In Australia, scientists introduced a gene into mousepox (a cousin of smallpox) to reduce pest populations—it worked so well that it wiped out 100% of affected mice, even
mice with immunity against the disease.4 Insertion of a gene into a virus’s
DNA is not rocket science now; in a few years, it will be elementary.
Perhaps the greatest fear today is manipulation of the flu. The genomic
sequence of the Spanish Flu virus that killed upwards of fifty million people
nearly a century ago has been widely published and could be reconstructed.
The Avian Flu is even more lethal albeit not readily contagious, via casual
aerosol delivery. How difficult would it be for a malevolent bioscientist to
manipulate any of these viruses to augment its contagiousness and transmit
it throughout population centers? A decade ago, these dangers were fanciful; today, they are on the horizon; within a decade, they will be pedestrian.
According to the National Academies of Science, “[t]he threat spectrum is broad and evolving—in some ways predictably, in other ways unexpectedly. . . . In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may
lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with unique, unpredictable characteristics.”5 Every passing day it will be slightly easier to commit
a violent catastrophe than it was yesterday, and so on. As far as can be seen
is the prospect of bioscience for life inseparably intertwined with bioscience
for violence.
These bioviolence dangers are distinguishable from every major
weapon including nuclear weapons. Other weapons have tracked an ancient
paradigm: ever larger concentrations of industrial strength lead to ever more
destructive weapons leading in turn to ever more powerful concentrations
of political power. Even today, making nuclear weapons requires an industrial infrastructure that demands the apparatus of statehood. New dangers of
bioviolence, however, invert that age-old paradigm. Weapons of mass annihilation can be made without anything like a nation-state’s industrial infrastructure, perhaps by a single individual. Whatever their motives, a nanofraction of humanity can now inflict a species-wide catastrophe that
4. See Ronald L. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to
Mousepox, 75 J. VIROLOGY 1205, 1205–10 (2001).
5. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBALIZATION, BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE
LIFE SCIENCES 49 (2006).
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breaches the progress of history. Thus, we stand on the threshold of an age
when ever fewer people can cause ever greater suffering to ever larger
populations. It is this new reality that holds the secret to emerging dangers
and calls for a revolution in our conception of global order.
This is not a hypothetical concern. Terrorist organizations have expressed interest in acquiring bioweapons. The eleventh volume of Al
Qaeda’s Encyclopedia of Jihad is devoted to chemical and biological weapons. Al Qaeda has announced that “biological weapons are considered the
least complicated and the easiest to manufacture of all weapons of mass
destruction.” Before 9/11, Al Qaeda operatives purchased anthrax and
plague from arms dealers in Kazakhstan, and Al Qaeda has repeatedly
urged followers to recruit microbiology and biotechnology experts. Following the Taliban’s fall, five Al Qaeda biological weapons labs in Afghanistan
tested positive for anthrax.6
Their reasoning might be reprehensible, but it is certainly not irrational. For anyone who views modernity as an abomination, the stark reality
is that the 9/11 attacks, the bombing of the Madrid and London subways,
mass murder in Mumbai, bombings in Jakarta, and numerous smaller attacks have all put civilization on edge—but to what effect? Western armies
still traverse the world, and western economies still determine winners and
losers. From our enemies’ perspective, the stakes must be raised!
Bioviolence is the easiest and most effective way to ravage global security. Envision a series of attacks against States closely allied with the
United States, timed to follow local officials’ expressions of friendship to
visiting U.S. dignitaries. The attacks would carry a well-publicized warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support
its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in
how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, is seriously undermined?
The truly unique characteristic of some bioweapons—distinguishing
them from every other type of weapon—is contagion. No other type of
weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter
how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If
you are not there, you are angry and grief-stricken but not physically injured. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread through time
and space, potentially imperiling everyone. A bio-offender could spread
disease to unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended
bioweapons carrying the disease indiscriminately.
6. See Harold Kennedy, Military Officials Warn Al Qaeda to Attack with WMD, NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Feb. 2005, at 28, 28–30; see also CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, ALQA’IDA’S WMD ACTIVITIES (May 13, 2005), http://cns.miis.edu/other/sjm_cht.htm; and Alan Cullison & Andrew Higgins, Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling Array of al Qaeda
Memos, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001, at A1. For a fuller discussion, see generally KELLMAN, supra
note 1, at 72–80.
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All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: it
raises incomparable levels of panic. Bioviolence is about planes flying
empty or perhaps not flying at all. It is about people refusing to interact
with each other for fear of unseen affliction. It is about canceling public
entertainment and tourism—even going to a movie would be too dangerous.
Bioviolence is about hiding our children. Everyone will be potentially vulnerable to our dread of disease. No one would know when an attack is over,
and no government can credibly tell an anxious population where and when
safety can be assured.
Ultimately, if one’s ambition is to rattle the pillars of modern civilization, and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in
motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call
into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens
security. To stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to
go.
The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is
untenable. Simply stated, there are capacities to do harm, and there are people who want to devote those capacities precisely to do harm. There should
be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture, and the day that disease is
effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything.
THE IMPERATIVE

OF

MCM PREPAREDNESS

This article considers international anti-bioviolence initiatives to promote medical counter-measure (MCM) preparedness. Preparedness refers
to policies that should be implemented now—pre-attack—to optimize postattack response effectiveness. Preparedness policies focus on: detecting
commission of an attack, diagnosing the attack agent, administering medical treatment to victims, limiting the spread and severity of that attack, restoring and sustaining social order and the rule of law, and remediating the
consequences of that attack.
By no means is preparedness the whole answer. Other prevention policies are essential to deny potential perpetrators access to weaponizeable
pathogens, to track and confine the trade in such pathogens or weaponization equipment, or to oversee bioresearch that has uniquely dangerous applications. Moreover, there are aspects of preparedness not directly
committed to MCMs (e.g., improving diagnostic and biosurveillance capabilities) that are no less important; indeed, no MCM distribution system can
operate effectively if other response activities are in disarray. All these prevention and other preparedness policies are omitted from discussion here
only to focus attention on the details of what needs to be done to promote
MCM preparedness.
Yet, even amid a healthy respect for the broad array of necessary antibioviolence measures, there are good reasons to focus on MCM prepared-
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ness. First, if MCMs are available, the victims can be treated and the consequences of an attack can be contained. In a bio-attack’s wake, there is no
higher priority than minimizing suffering and death and stanching the
spread of disease. Second, by reducing damage and containing losses, we
can deter attacks. A culprit who seeks to inflict mass violence and panic
will be less inclined to use disease in the face of organized and efficient
measures to limit consequences.
Importantly, engaging the international community on MCM preparedness could have powerfully beneficial repercussions. This is a singular topic
that is in everyone’s interest to advance because an effective plan for MCM
stockpiling and distribution could be dual-use—it could be a major system
for addressing natural pandemics as well as bioviolence. Engagement of
international organizations and the private sector, along with many States
could thus transform this entire policy arena, designing an integrated global
system where benefits are shared, responsibilities are common, and security
is mutual.
While bioviolence MCM preparedness can be dual-use, such preparedness is distinguishable from natural disease preparedness in at least four
noteworthy respects. First, law enforcement has a pivotal role because bioviolence is a crime of human intentionality. Second, bioviolence caused by
intelligent perpetrators is distinguishable both spatially and temporally from
the spread of natural disease which tends to disperse in predictable patterns.
An intentional actor whose goal is to frustrate response efforts could commit attacks in multiple, non-contiguous countries, confounding even the
best preparations to deliver MCMs. Third, a bioviolence attack might pose
far more acute needs for response and care especially at the moment and
site of attack. Fourth, the public attitude in response to an attack is likely to
be different than to a natural disease outbreak. Again, the factor of human
intentionality alters perceptions about public safety and security that are not
merely measured by mortality counts, and bioviolence inevitably suggests
recurrence which further undermines public confidence. All these implications present unique challenges for bioviolence preparedness.
A. The U.S. Approach to MCM Preparedness
In the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) administers Project BioShield, a comprehensive plan to encourage
development of CBRN countermeasures.7 The Office of the Assistant Sec7. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Project BioShield,
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/bioshield/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009); and HHS Public
Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 13109, 13113 (Mar. 20, 2007); see also FRANK GOTTRON, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: PURPOSES AND AUTHORITIES 1 (2009).
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retary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) has lead responsibility for
MCM procurement and funding.8
Within ASPR, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA) has authority for managing MCM planning. BARDA’s
directive is to “coordinate an integrated, systematic approach to planning
for and executing research, development and acquisition of medical countermeasures for public health emergencies.”9 BARDA is responsible for
driving MCM analysis and prioritization; coordinating approaches to research, development, and drug acquisition; and executing advanced development and procurement of MCMs for CBRN threats and pandemic
influenza. BARDA facilitates communications between the U.S. government, the biomedical industry, and other R&D participants through workshops, web portals, and dialogues, as well as providing a degree of
transparency.10
BARDA leads the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure
Enterprise (PHEMCE), a multi-agency collaboration including the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (HHS/FDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
PHEMCE’s mission areas include defining and prioritizing MCM requirements, focusing research, development, and procurement activities in order
to obtain those identified requirements, and then establishing deployment
and use strategies for those products.11 To prepare an MCM development
and procurement strategy, PHEMCE gathers information about existing
threats and their medical/public health consequences and available MCMs
in order to assess the development pipeline, current levels of preparedness,
concepts of use, product specifications, and the estimated costs of their development and acquisition. PHEMCE thereupon determines the require8. HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 13109, 13109 (Mar. 20, 2007);
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 18 directs the U.S. MCM effort to concentrate
efforts on countering the threats of weapons of mass destruction. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive 18: Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 43 WKLY.
COMP. PRES. DOC. 128, 132 (Jan. 31, 2007).
9. PAHPA Stakeholders Meeting, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/conferences/pahpa/2007/barda_pahpa_stakeholder_meeting_v4b_sgh_508.pdf; NATIONAL BIODEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, AMENDED CHARTER
(2008), http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/omsph/nbsb/nbsbamendedcharter.pdf.
10. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MEDICAL
COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DRAFT BARDA STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT 1 (2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/documents/
draftbardaplan.pdf.
11. See HHS PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE ENTERPRISE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREATS 5–6
(2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/documents/phemce_implplan_041607final.
pdf.
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ments and priorities for each type of MCM and identifies and prioritizes
near-, mid-, and long-term development and acquisition programs.
BARDA receives scientific and technical input from the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) which tracks bioscientific trends and provides recommendations for biodefense research and development activities.
Research and development programs engage the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), particularly the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID), which has primary responsibility to see that promising
drug candidates are awarded contracts through Project BioShield’s funds.
NIH/NIAID can expedite reviews of promising biodefense drugs by simplifying the application process.12
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), managed by HHS/CDC, is designed to provide medical supplies to protect Americans against a public
health emergency that potentially exceeds local readiness and capacity.13
The SNS formulary was initially designed to combat specific severe
threats;14 it now contains a broader set of antibiotics, medical supplies, antidotes, antitoxins, antiviral drugs, vaccines, and other pharmaceuticals valued at approximately $3.5 billion.15 The Director of CDC has the authority,
in consultation with the Surgeon General and the Secretary of HHS, to order the deployment of the SNS upon approval by ASPR. Distribution of
SNS assets has been the subject of elaborate state and national planning
efforts, which include the formation of private sector partnerships to assist
in the critical areas of asset storage and transportation.16
12. For example, the NIAID has used $35.6 million to award contracts and grants to promote
basic research and development with the intent that the medical countermeasures will one day be
acquired by the government. See Project BioShield Reauthorization Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 5–12 (2006) (statement of Alex M. Azar, II, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services) [hereinafter Project BioShield Reauthorization Issues].
13. To receive SNS assets, an affected state’s governor’s office can request the deployment
of the SNS assets from CDC or HHS, which will evaluate the situation and determine a prompt
course of action. Each state is required to develop plans to receive and distribute SNS medicines
and medical supplies to local communities. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Strategic National Stockpile (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/.
14. The SNS formulary was designed in response to the CDC’s Category A threat: anthrax,
botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers.
15. See TODD PIESTER, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE
OVERVIEW 6–8, 22 (2008), available at http://emergency.cdc.gov/coca/summaries/pdf/SNS_0701
08.pdf. The SNS will continue to broaden its scope. According to the PHEMCE Implementation
Plan, acquisitions of emergency medications through and beyond FY 2013 will include: broad
spectrum antibiotics; broad spectrum antivirals for ebola, junin, marbug, and variola viruses; anthrax vaccine and antitoxin; point-of-care diagnostics for all biological threat agents; and filovirus
medical countermeasures. HHS PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 15–19.
16. For examples of state and local efforts, see the work of the National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). National Association of County and City Health
Officials, Strategic National Stockpile, http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/SNS/index.cfm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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Notably for this article’s focus, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) directs the HHS Secretary to “provide leadership in international programs, initiatives, and policies that deal with public
health and medical emergency preparedness and response.”17 On behalf of
the Secretary, ASPR leads HHS international preparedness efforts and response activities in close collaboration with the Office of Global Health
Affairs (OGHA), the CDC, and FDA. Within ASPR, the Office of
Medicine, Science and Public Health (OMSPH) provides expert advice on
international issues, and officials within the Office of the Assistant Secretary interact directly with the international community.
B. The Need for a Global Approach to MCM Preparedness
No one can be certain about where a bioviolence attack might occur.
What is certain is that a sufficiently severe attack will have global implications, wholly ignoring borders. The stuff of bioviolence—pathogens, laboratory equipment, and knowledge—is ubiquitous and growing more so.
Once a bioweapon is prepared, perpetrators from anywhere can slide across
national boundaries and release disease anonymously. Moreover, vulnerabilities are global. If a highly contagious agent is used, the interests of international security demand that its spread be stanched. If a noncontagious
agent (e.g., anthrax) is used, the potential for massive loss of life (perhaps
from repeated attacks) would horrifically damage the global economy and
diplomacy.
Even if by some magic potion Americans could be immunized against
every bioviolence agent, the prospect of witnessing attacks that devastate
allies, transform developing societies into despair, cancel transport and
trade, and sow worldwide panic would beget a profoundly catastrophic environment. In this context, globalization and interdependency are not mere
clichés. To plug a vulnerability somewhere but leave huge gaps elsewhere
is to build a dam from a sieve. If only for the potential magnitude of loss,
perhaps counted in millions of lives and trillions of dollars, Americans
would be gravely wounded by a foreign bioviolence attack.
Yet, global bioviolence MCM preparedness is appallingly inadequate.
Consider smallpox, arguably among the gravest of potential bioviolence
agents. When smallpox was formally declared eradicated nearly three decades ago, WHO had 200 million doses of vaccine. In the intervening years,
that number has decreased to about 2.5 million doses, located in a single
site near Geneva.18 Some nations have developed their own stockpiles. Altogether, stockpiles of smallpox vaccine are less than 800 million doses –
17. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat.
2831 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SMALLPOX GLOBAL VACCINE RESERVE: REPORT BY
THE SECRETARIAT (2005), available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/A58_9en.pdf.
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enough for at best 12 percent of the world’s population assuming ideal distribution. Over 80 percent of these doses are stockpiled in six countries;
slightly less than 50 percent belong to the United States.19 Ten countries
have appreciable stockpiles of vaccine (relative to their population size).
Only four of these countries are outside NATO and the G-8: Israel, Singapore, South Africa, and Malaysia.20 Nearly all other countries have little or
no vaccine.21 Even under optimal conditions to meet an emergency, approximately seven months would be needed for full surge production; even then,
global smallpox vaccine manufacturing capacity would be about 40 million
doses per month.22
These deficiencies were demonstrated in the 2005 Atlantic Storm exercise on smallpox response:
Although some countries had enough to vaccinate their entire
population, others had only enough of the vaccine for one percent
of their citizens, or even less. “When I saw the list [of vaccine
stocks], that was a shock to me, how little prepared many countries are, even rich Western countries,” said Klaas de Vries, who
played the Dutch Prime Minister.23
The lack of an international architecture for MCM preparedness undermines the entire U.S. anti-bioviolence strategy by insinuating that American
scientific genius is to be isolated exclusively to self-protection. Bluntly
stated, it is illegitimate to assert that while threats of bioviolence are inherently international in scope and consequence, MCM preparedness against
those threats should be pursued independently by each sovereign nation.
Finally, it can be argued that MCM preparedness is obligatory under
the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR) which require that
States develop, strengthen, and maintain the capacity to respond promptly
and effectively to public health emergencies of international concern and
maintain a national public health emergency response plan.24
19. See Bradley T. Smith et al, Navigating the Storm: Report and Recommendations from the
Atlantic Storm Exercise, 3 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI.
256, 256–67 (2005).
20. G8 nations include: United States, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, and Russia. A complete listing of NATO members is available at http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/nato_countries.htm.
21. Smith et al., supra note 19.
22. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 18.
23. Daniel S. Hamilton & Bradley T. Smith, Atlantic Storm: A Simulated Bioterrorist Attack
Demonstrated the Weakness of International Public Health and Security Systems when Dealing
with a Sudden Outbreak of Highly Infectious Diseases, EMBO REP., Jan. 2006, at 4, 6.
24. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 40–42
(2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHR_2005_en.pdf. The IHRs recommend that national plans enable authorities:
a) to determine rapidly the control measures required to prevent domestic and international spread;
b) to provide support through specialized staff, laboratory analysis of samples
. . . and logistical assistance . . . ;
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C. The GHSAG Initiative
The most important recent international effort to reduce bioviolence
dangers is the agreement of the Global Health Security Action Group
(GHSAG) to focus attention on a global infrastructure for distributing
medicines worldwide. GHSAG includes ministerial level participation from
the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the
United Kingdom, as well as leadership of the European Commission and
the World Health Organization. It has no de jure authority, but its high level
participants can coordinate and commit to devoting substantial resources to
advance common health objectives. 25
In the 2008 Ministerial Statement, GHSAG members formally recognized that international coordination is necessary for delivery of MCMs to
patients:
Regarding medical countermeasures, we considered the need to
develop a sustainable global infrastructure that would allow us to
work together to counteract the health consequences of natural or
man-made threats. Our initial efforts will focus on sharing inforc) to provide on-site assistance as required to supplement local investigations;
d) to provide a direct operational link with senior health and other officials to approve
rapidly and implement containment and control measures;
e) to provide direct liaison with other relevant government ministries;
f) to provide, by the most efficient means of communication available, links with hospitals, clinics, airports, ports, ground crossings, laboratories and other key operational
areas for the dissemination of information and recommendations received from WHO
regarding events in the State Party’s own territory and in the territories of other States
Parties; [and]
g) to establish, operate and maintain a national public health emergency response plan,
including the creation of multidisciplinary/multisectoral teams to respond to events
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern . . . .
Id.
25. See Global Health Security Initiative, Ministerial Statements: Brussels, Belgium (Dec.
2008), http://www.ghsi.ca/english/statementbrussels2008.asp. The 2008 Ministerial Meeting produced the following commitments:
• On risk and crisis communications, we agreed to continue our collaboration to
strengthen our collective knowledge and to apply the principles of risk and crisis
communications in specific situations.
• We agreed to enhance our laboratory capabilities by improving the transportation of
diagnostic specimens and reference materials; facilitating the exchange of scientific
expertise among members; and strengthening diagnostic capacities, both within and
beyond member laboratories. This will be extended to an international network of
radiobioassay laboratories.
• We supported increased GHSI coordination to improve global early alerting and reporting, including risk assessment and integrated analysis of CBRN and pandemic
influenza threats, and recognize that the GHSI can bring added value in stimulating
the timely exchange of information toward the prevention of risks to health.
• We agreed to enhance our preparedness for CBRN threats and pandemic influenza
by collaborating in moving towards a sustainable global infrastructure, including research and development, for medical countermeasures.
• We welcomed the proposal of Commissioner for Health Ms. Androulla Vassiliou to
have a joint cross-national exercise organised between the GHSI partners and the
European Union in 2010. The exercise will support the work of the GHSI in the area
of risk and crisis communications.
Id.
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mation on research and development; improving diagnostics capacity; developing strategies for shelf life extension of stockpiled
medical countermeasures; and collaborating on the development
of specific therapeutics, vaccines, and/or diagnostic tools for specific threats.26
GHSAG’s interest in MCMs includes addressing regulatory issues related to MCM licensing and distribution. GHSAG members are planning to
share best practices and discuss potential avenues for cooperation.
Yet, global MCM preparedness is not simple. Advancing MCM
preparedness on a global level is fundamentally more problematic than advancing comparable initiatives domestically. The expense and logistical
challenges multiply greatly when the target is all of humanity, not just a
single country. Even more troubling, there is a daunting governance deficit;
no explicit structure is authorized to process such initiatives. Every proposed initiative requires identification of an implementation mechanism,
and any State can frustrate collective action. A truly global approach is
easier said than done.
In this context, GHSAG’s narrow membership deserves attention.
There is an inherent tension between inclusion and the need for consensus;
the more that a truly global body must respect the voices of nearly two
hundred sovereigns, the less that it will generate consensus on what to do.27
Indeed, GHSAG’s efficacy can be attributed to the fact that it includes only
eight nations plus a regional organization (the European Commission) and
one international organization (the WHO). These nations are hardly representative of the world: six are involved in both NATO and the United Nations Western European and Others Group (the United States is a partial
member). China and India, which together represent one-third of the
world’s population and are among the fastest growing economies, are not
included. GHSAG includes no Islamic, African, South American, or former
Soviet Union nations, and only one Asian nation (Japan).
While GHSAG’s limited membership no doubt contributes to its ability to advance initiatives, a useful middle ground between its very narrow
membership and something truly global (perhaps engagement at the level of
the G-20) might offer benefits in terms of engagement and resources that
would be worth the difficulties of reaching consensus among a larger group.
Worth mentioning is a group with fifteen member states that has unquestionable de jure authority to address threats to international peace and
security (certainly including bioviolence): the United Nations Security
Council. Among experts, there is little confidence that the UNSC will soon
take up the challenge of bioviolence MCM preparedness; untangling the
26. Id.
27. Moises Naim, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, FOREIGN POLICY July–Aug. 2009, at 136.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST303.txt

562

unknown

Seq: 13

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

15-JAN-10

9:34

[Vol. 6:3

many political reasons why this body might be an ineffective planning
venue are far beyond this article’s scope. Yet, as will be discussed, to get
from where we are today to a preparedness system that is truly global
means adjusting national laws, adapting programs of international and regional organizations, and perhaps creating new institutional frameworks
(hopefully minimal). Much of these modifications might proceed more expeditiously with direction from the one international body that is legitimately constituted to sustain security.
D. Article Focus: Legal Challenges of a Global MCM Preparedness
Strategy
Progressive action to stockpile and distribute MCMs requires an altogether unique degree of international cooperation and thus can strengthen
the development of international law. Attention needs to be devoted to legal
constraints on governments’ authority to take necessary action as well as to
the potential for substantial intrusion into personal liberties and proprietary
rights. Addressing these legal issues now, before a bioviolence attack, will
not only facilitate expeditious response, it will refine modalities of global
planning and build confidence.
The following sections of this article focus on legal challenges organized under four broad categories: (1) risk assessment and management; (2)
incentivizing research and development of new MCMs; (3) facilitating
MCM licensing and emergency authorization; and (4) planning for MCM
stockpiling, delivery, and dispensation. These challenges are integrated, and
initiatives to meet these challenges are continuous and mutually reinforcing.
It is crucial to emphasize that this article is an outline of a strategy.
Many potential issues and initiatives are discussed with reference to mechanisms currently advanced by relevant international organizations. Each initiative could be the subject of its own lengthy article. Presenting these
initiatives in rapid succession might convey an impression that they are
undemanding, without political objection or intractable problems that might
impede their implementation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
These initiatives must be implemented in an astoundingly dysfunctional
world order that hurls obstructions at every step.
The objective here is to portray a map for advancing global MCM
preparedness not because the journey is simple but because only with a map
can policy makers gain perspective about the magnitude of the undertaking
they confront. A map necessarily omits many details. Its purpose is to depict the key components and to draw their interconnections. To get to the
destination of improved security from bioviolence will be an arduous undertaking. It may be easier, hopefully, with an understanding of where we
need to go.
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MANAGEMENT

The first task of MCM planning processes is risk management: the
process of constructing, evaluating, implementing, monitoring, and revising
strategies for reducing losses from future hazards and dealing with the recovery process should a hazard occur. This includes an assessment process
to prioritize risks, identify existing and near-term available MCMs for high
priority risks, and allocate scarce resources for developing those MCMs.28
These prioritization decisions critically set the boundaries for the system’s
future response capability and help to ensure a comprehensive and riskprioritized biopreparedness strategy.
Related to risk management is the need to resolve disparities of terminology with regard to biorisks and MCMs. Harmonization of research lexicons and stage nomenclature for MCM R&D can reduce the costs of
collaboration and encourage engagement of private and academic sectors.
Simply, everyone should use the same research and regulatory language.29
Research can be shared more readily and technology advances can be measured more reliably and fairly against one another for both scientific and
contracting purposes.
Today, assessing and managing risks is done exclusively on the national level. Even in Europe where the European Commission might be expected to assess and manage risks regionally, most relevant decisions are
left to national authorities. Worldwide, the upshot is that pivotal decisions
28. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) completed a Bioterrorism Risk
Assessment; it continues to review and improve its processes. Current U.S. bioterrorism risk assessment principles are the following:
• Risk analysis needs to address bioterrorism uncertainties: Probabilistic risk assessment is a proven technique that can be used for managing the risks from
bioterrorism.
• Bioterrorism risk analysis requires access to multidisciplinary expertise: Key disciplines include biology, epidemiology, psychology, public communications, decision
analysis and risk analysis, operations research, probability, and statistics.
• Risk analysis must be responsive to dynamic terrorism threats: Risk analysis must
take into account changing threat conditions and their resource implications over
time. Intelligent adversaries will adjust their strategies and tactics to counter the U.S.
ability to detect, prepare for, and respond to their attacks. Therefore, the nature of
risk is a continuing evolution and will always be difficult to estimate.
• The purpose of risk assessment is to support risk management: Policy makers should
develop risk mitigation measures that are informed by risk analysis, including assessment of social, psychological, direct, and indirect economic impacts, and should apply such measures in a manner that consciously seeks to avoid unintended
consequences.
COMM. ON METHODOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DEP’T ON HOMELAND SECURITY’S BIOLOGICAL AGENT RISK ANALYSIS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
BIOTERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT—A CALL FOR CHANGE 9 (2008) (summarizing and discussing
the Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment report).
29. The U.S. government has established a Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) scheme
that standardizes the designation of the stage of development for evolving technologies and provides a common understanding of technological status. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, TECHNOLOGY
READINESS ASSESSMENT (TRA) DESKBOOK, at H-1 to H-28 (2005), available at http://
www.dod.mil/ddre/doc/May2005_TRA_2005_DoD.pdf.
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are not so much made inconsistently; they are typically ignored altogether
whether due to lack of awareness of biothreats, political disputes about
these threats’ strategic relevance, or funding disputes about relative priorities. Viewed from afar, there is a woeful lack of decision-making capacity
that is the necessary foundation of preparedness. In this anarchic environment, private sector participants who might produce MCMs or develop distribution capabilities are dissuaded from becoming engaged.
In the absence of an authoritative body that makes critical choices
about assessing risks and developing capacities to manage those risks, it is
difficult to understand how global MCM preparedness can proceed effectively. Briefly, these choices include:
1. How and by whom should a global list of biothreat agents be
selected? How should criteria for selection be harmonized in
view of disparate perspectives on the threats, pre-existing
vaccination levels, and overall health conditions?
2. How should each agent’s potential consequences—its lethality, virulence, contagiousness, etc.—be weighed against an
MCM’s benefits and costs including its side effects; its per
unit cost of production; and the capacity to produce it before
or immediately after an outbreak? And, how quickly it can be
delivered to an infected area and dispensed?
3. Should resources focus on pre-attack immunization or on
treatment? Widespread immunization is expensive with no
guarantee that a selected disease will occur. Reliance on postattack treatment, however, can leave populations vulnerable
to large losses. (The United States civilian population treatment strategy relies primarily on post-event prophylaxis or
post-exposure treatment, although it has stockpiled MCMs
against threats of potential catastrophic consequence—e.g.,
smallpox—to dispense to potentially every American as
needed.)
4. How should MCM R&D cope with various agents? Currently, most MCMs are “one-bug, one-drug.” Increasingly,
MCM research will focus on broad spectrum treatments and
platform technologies that facilitate prompt production of
MCMs. (The U.S. National Strategy for Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction targets the
use of existing approaches for developing medical countermeasures to address challenges posed by traditional CBRN
agents while calling for a flexible capability to develop new
MCMs.30)
30. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive 18, supra note 8. HSPD-18 lays out three
principles to guide this effort:
• Integrate fundamental discovery and medical development to realize novel medical
countermeasure capabilities.
• Establish a favorable environment for evaluating new approaches.
• Integrate the products of new and traditional approaches.
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5. How will each MCM be dispensed? With regard to a specific
disease agent, is comprehensive vaccination or ring vaccination preferable?31 Similarly, some MCMs must be dispensed
by public actors (e.g., vaccines), while others can be distributed directly to and self-administered by individuals (e.g.,
oral antibiotics).
International law cannot and should not answer these questions. International law should, inter alia, identify the authoritative body for making
these decisions, the substantive and procedural standards that such decisions should satisfy, and the degree of transparency and reviewability of
such decisions.
Altogether, there is value in having an official international body that
defines priorities for MCM development and incentivizes how potential developers pursue those priorities. While a fully authoritative global body
with powers comparable to BARDA-PHEMCE-NBSB is unrealistic, a more
limited initiative is to establish an international biopreparedness panel or
task force that defines harmonized criteria for risk management, enabling
governments to better assess probabilities of specific bioviolence attacks
and their predictable consequences. This task force could also usefully build
an information exchange platform among scientific researchers, funders,
and private sector biodefense entities for the purpose of communicating research and development opportunities and challenges to decision makers,
thereby optimizing global competition for producing and developing promising anti-bioviolence MCMs.
This task force should be international in scope so that it can harmonize MCM preparedness planning worldwide. While the WHO and related
organizations should be engaged in these activities, and while this task
force should be international in scope, bioviolence risk management is not
centrally a public health function and entails determinations about threats
and security that exceed WHO’s mandate.
At minimum, this task force should establish a platform for gathering
scientific input and forging scientific consequence on risk management
questions. Moreover, it should track ongoing trends and opportunities that
can be exploited to promote and streamline future biodefense research and
development activities. At maximum, it could form an international MCM
Id. at 131–32. Recently, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and GE Healthcare announced a collaboration aimed at the construction of an advanced development and production
facility for the manufacture of vaccines and therapeutics to counter a range of biological threats.
Press Release, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, UPMC and GE Healthcare Collaborate to
Protect United States from Bioterrorism, Infectious Diseases (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://
www.upmc.com/MediaRelations/NewsReleases/2009/Pages/UPMC-GEC-Bioterrorism-Infectious-Diseases-Protection.aspx.
31. Cheun-Yen Lau, Ring Vaccination vs. Mass Vaccination in the Event of a Smallpox Attack on the United States, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, Sept. 2004, available
at http://www.acep.org/ACEPmembership.aspx?id=39246.
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development strategy, plan for its implementation, and serve as an organizational structure to handle the attendant procedural and administrative
tasks. An intermediate role, in addition to gathering scientific input and
forging consensus, would be to promote harmonization of the entrepreneurial aspects of bioviolence risk management by promoting innovative procurement modalities that incentivize MCM development and
production.32
II.

INCENTIVIZING MCM RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

Discovering and producing effective bioviolence MCMs is a risky business. It is difficult to predict which specific pathogen perpetrators of bioviolence will use. Developing MCMs against each of these pathogens is
costly and time consuming. On average, developing a new drug takes nearly
ten years, and costs between $800 million and $1.7 billion.33 These substantial resources would be devoted to drugs that, in the end, may not be approved for distribution.34
Even if approved, profits from sales might not cover the costs of development. Bioviolence does not occur frequently, and the odds of exposure to
a disease that might be used in an attack are low. “[T]he global market for
just one cholesterol-lowering agent exceeds the global market for all vaccines together, not just those that comprise a security countermeasure.”35
With such small and uncertain markets for MCMs, most private medicine
developers choose to forego expensive MCM research, development, and
production.
Governments and other MCM purchasers can impel private sector participation by providing R&D assistance, identifying R&D priorities, facili32. For example, milestone contracts that provide for installment deliveries can lower contracting risks, assuring steady revenue and encouraging rapid delivery. Payment terms might also
allow purchasers to pay a discounted price for MCMs that have yet to be approved with a remainder to be paid later upon full approval; MCM producers could thereby avoid the risks of conventional all-or-nothing contracting even as governments retain periodic opportunities to evaluate the
products. In the non-price context, useful terms might include requiring producers to absorb the
cost of storing products and maintaining their surety or allowing for the designation of vendors as
exclusive suppliers. Terms might also include designating vendors as the exclusive suppliers to
ensure a continued relationship or protect intellectual property concerns. Contracts could require
producers to create and maintain unused excess production capacity to be tapped or “surged”
during an emergency. The United States has considered these terms in legislation governing use of
its special reserve fund to purchase stockpile assets. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2006);
see also Jonathan B. Tucker, Developing Medical Countermeasures: From BioShield to BARDA,
70 DRUG DEV. RES. 224, 226, 231 (2009) (discussing specific requirements for MCM
contracting).
33. Project BioShield Reauthorization Issues, supra note 12, at 7.
34. “It is estimated that of every 5,000 ‘candidate’ drugs that look promising on the lab
bench, only 5 enter clinical trials, and only 1 of those achieves FDA licensure.” Bradley T. Smith
et al., Developing Medical Countermeasures for Biodefense, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 42, 42 (2009), available at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.
org/website/resources/publications/2009/biomemo/2009-03-27-devel_med_cntrmeasures.html.
35. Project BioShield Reauthorization Issues, supra note 12, at 7.
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tating regulatory approval, and guaranteeing future procurement contracts.
Initiatives that reduce barriers and risks associated with potential MCMs
can encourage producers to brave the dangerous beginning R&D stages. For
example, MCMs for smallpox36 and anthrax37 that the United States widely
stockpiles are the result of policies that have substantially altered typical
market dynamics associated with pharmaceuticals.
This section considers two legal aspects of incentivization: (1) protecting MCM producers from potential liabilities; and (2) clarifying producers’
patent rights.
A. Liability Protection of MCM Producers
MCMs could cause injury or even death among healthy recipients who
might seek damages from producers. This risk of liability weighs heavily
against expending vast sums to produce vaccines, deterring substantial investments on new MCMs with potentially unknown effects.38 The variability of liability regimes across countries adds legal uncertainty.
Providing liability protection could ease pharmaceutical companies’
concerns, especially during an emergency. Yet, there are substantial fairness
issues that should militate against broad immunity that substantially infringes on victims’ remedies. Efforts should be made, therefore, to harmonize liability standards worldwide for MCM development so as to both
incentivize MCM development and respect victims.
Accomplishing harmonization of liability standards means addressing
two questions: first, how should risks of loss be assigned between the producer and the public? And second, how should activities be distinguished
for purposes of deciding how to assess liability?
1. Assigning Risk of Loss
Administration of MCMs raises important questions of individual versus community welfare. At least three models for assigning risk of loss are
available. First, a government could administer the MCM, substitute itself
for the producer in any dispute, or indemnify a producer who might be held
liable. The normal liability standards would apply: the victim would have to
show that the MCM caused the harm; the difference from normal standards
is that the government, not the producer, pays damages. Although protec36. Strategic National Stockpile, supra note 13.
37. Id.
38. In the United States in the 1980s, adverse reactions to vaccines created liability concerns
for producers which caused them to stop producing vaccines that, in turn, led to a decline in child
vaccination rates. Remaining manufacturers increased their prices to cover liability costs which
led to significant vaccine shortages. See AM. MED ASSOC., REPORTS OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR ADULT VACCINES 47–48 (June 2005), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/38/a-05bot.pdf.
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tive of producers, this approach compels government acceptance of burdensome litigation of individual claims.
A second approach is to establish a no-fault compensation scheme
whereby the government compensates victims without concern as to
whether the producer was at fault—recovery is allowed so long as the victim suffers any stipulated injury presumed to be caused by the medicine.
This is the approach of the United States National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,39 as well as of the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003.40 Its virtue is to minimize any risk to the producer and
simplify victims’ recovery, but it disregards whether the producer might
have engaged in misconduct.
The third model, used by the U.S. Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness (PREP) Act,41 is to immunize producers and to permit victim
recovery from a specially established fund for claims of loss due to use of
MCMs in a public health emergency. However, immunity does not apply in
cases of willful misconduct. A victim must choose whether to collect from
the “Covered Countermeasures Process Fund”42 or prove that the producer’s misconduct caused the losses. This approach’s virtue is to enable
the victim to recover from the fund while also disallowing immunity if the
producer is at fault.
Each nation can adopt (or adapt) any of these models so long as each
nation insulates producers from alleged losses due to the risks of using their
MCMs (but not losses due to producer malfeasance). Indeed, the WHO uses
this approach when administering vaccine donation programs.43
2. Criteria of Liability
For any of the approaches that turn on fault, it is important to clarify
what activities might justify extending liability to a producer. Liability
should be imposed on a producer that:
39. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2006).
40. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. 180-20, 117 Stat. 638
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d to -6e (2006).
42. See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Health Resources and Services Administration,
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, http://www.hrsa.gov/countermeasurescomp/default.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
43. In regards to H5N1, “Bird Flu,” the WHO plan states, “[w]ith regard to liability associated with a WHO H5N1 influenza vaccine stockpile, manufacturers and/or suppliers are responsible for developing vaccines in accordance with WHO standards. Countries requesting vaccine
from the stockpile would assume responsibility for their use. It was recommended that the terms
of a disclaimer to reflect responsibility for liability should be developed in advance to circumvent
delays in a pandemic situation.” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
ACTION PLAN TO INCREASE VACCINE SUPPLY: PROGRESS REPORT 2008, at 15 (2008), available at
http://www.who.int/vaccine_research/Global_Pandemic_Influenza.pdf. The WHO will follow
these same mandatory disclaimer procedures for its H1N1 donation program set to begin in November 2009. Lisa Schlein, Developing Countries to Get Swine Flu Vaccine, VOICE OF AMERICA
NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-25-voa43.cfm.
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• fails to provide full and accurate disclosure about the risks of
its products to regulatory authorities during the approval
process;
• delivers substandard product due to production errors, poor
handling procedures, or other forms of negligence (or worse);
or
• fails to provide sufficient use instructions or fails to warn
users of potential risks.
There are other situations that are harder to resolve. For example, if the
producer’s estimate of the harmful consequences of using the MCM is too
low or its estimate of the MCM’s benefits is too low, should there be liability? If the mistake was not willful, it still might be the case that the producer undertook insufficient study (especially in the case of a drug
authorized for emergency use); imposing liability could deter seeking authorization without time-consuming testing. A more perplexing grounds for
liability is where the MCM works as anticipated, but the producer fails to
deliver as much as promised, or as quickly as promised, perhaps due to the
challenges of meeting unanticipated “surge production” demands. Again,
even if the producer acted in good faith, there is reason to impose liability
in that the producer’s promise of supply was the basis of the government’s
decision; knowledge that such a promise might become the basis of liability
will induce producers to offer such promises more carefully.
Altogether, international law should guide and harmonize the criteria
of liability protections for MCM producers. There will be benefits from
uniform and predictable rules that can foster increased investment in MCM
research and development. Failure to protect the system against such liabilities should be regarded as a breach of State responsibility.44 State responsibility applies for undermining the international harmonization of liability
that is essential to the effectively administering a global MCM
infrastructure.
B. Patent Protection
The intellectual property rights associated with MCMs are a vexing
issue demanding international resolution. In the context of bioviolence, the
key question is how States can gain access to MCMs if the patent holder is
unwilling or unable to deliver in sufficient quantities.
MCM producers argue that the high risks of making safe and effective
vaccines would make no economic sense if, having configured a critical
44. The U.N. International Law Commission, in its 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, posits, “There is an internationally wrongful act of a
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission . . . constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State.” U.N. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session ¶ 76, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (Apr. 23–June 1, 2001
and July 2–Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.
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drug, someone could readily copy and sell it for a price that need not reflect
the sizeable research investment. From developing nations’ perspective,
paying a price that reflects research costs plus profit is virtually impossible.
They could produce the drug at a fraction of the cost, and their populations
desperately need these medications; they argue that the pharmaceutical sector’s pursuit of exorbitant profits should not be a death sentence for millions
of innocent people.
Under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 31, States may grant compulsory patent licenses that allow domestic producers to manufacture a patented item without the patent holder’s consent, provided such licenses must
be limited to meeting domestic needs, not for export, and the original patent
holder is to be paid adequate compensation.45 As of 2008, forty-four WTO
member-States had ratified Article 31bis.46 Significantly, paragraph (b)
requires:
[S]uch use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that
such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period
of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.
The policy that compulsory licenses be granted for domestic needs has
been criticized for failing to provide relief to least developed countries that
lack a domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. So, in 2003, the
WTO Council announced that a country may produce generics of patented
drugs for export if another country is in need. The importing country must
inform the Council what products it seeks and how much—perhaps a timeconsuming obstacle during an unforeseen public health emergency when
MCMs are immediately needed. National patent regimes may include specialized provisions allowing States to circumvent patents for national security reasons or in times of emergency (in which bioviolence certainly would
fall).47
45. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C art. 31,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
46. Erin M. Andersen, Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs: Getting Patented Drugs
to Patients Most in Need, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 85, 101 (2009).
47. Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the
Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 442 (2005). For
example, in 2003, El Salvador published a Trade Policy Review describing the country’s Law on
the Promotion and Protection of Intellectual Property (LFPPI). The LFPPI provides for the grant
of a compulsory license in emergencies or national security contexts, if it is non-assignable, nonexclusive, and provides adequate remuneration to the rights holder. The Council for TRIPS reviewed the Salvadoran LFPPI and found it to be in compliance with international agreements. Id.
at 457.
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Some States have already issued compulsory licenses for domestic use
(e.g., Thailand, discussed below), and in at least two cases, pairs of countries have invoked Article 31bis’s procedure (Canada-Rwanda in 2007 and
India-Nepal in 2008).48 Notably, the issue of whether a State may grant a
compulsory license for a bioviolence MCM arose in connection with the
2001 anthrax attacks. Canada overrode the patent on Cipro, a strong antibiotic. The Bush administration’s threat to circumvent Cipro’s patent protection evoked a promise from Bayer, the patent holder, to supply the drug at a
deeply discounted price.
Many unanswered questions belie Article 31(b)’s utility in the context
of a bioterror event.49 Who should assess the grounds for compulsory licensing? Under what conditions? In what timeframe? Further, the language
of Article 31(b) uses undefined terms—“reasonable commercial terms and
conditions” and “reasonable period of time”—which could slow any negotiating process. Perhaps the most complex problem is whether a nation
should be able to claim an emergency exception to issue a compulsory license if an attack has not yet occurred? Most bioviolence agents act too
quickly to allow a post-attack licensing and production process. Does a nation need a compulsory license simply because the product costs more than
a State would like to pay? Consider the case of Thailand which issued compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs but also a heart disease medicine
called Plavix—not surprisingly, international criticism was much stronger
for the latter than the former.50 While the threat of HIV/AIDS is a clear
48. See Andersen, supra note 46, at 105, 112. According to Andersen:
On July 19, 2007, Rwanda took the first step in the Article 31bis process and
informed the WTO of its intention to import compulsory-licensed pharmaceuticals for
public health reasons. In September 2007, Canada became the first country to issue a
compulsory export license and granted Apotex, a Canadian generic drug manufacturer,
permission to supply TriAvir, a combination AIDS drug, to Rwanda.
....
In early 2008, Nepal became the second country to apply for an import-license
under Article 31bis. Indian drug-manufacturer Natco Pharma responded, and sought out
a compulsory license to produce generic versions of two anti-cancer drugs. Natco has
proposed to manufacture 45,000 doses of the drugs, and, subject to Article 31(h), remunerate the patent-holders a five percent royalty.
Id. at 103–04. See also George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory Licensing Schemes Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1075–79
(2009).
49. See Taiwo A Oriola, Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as
a Biosecurity Strategy, 7 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 329–30 (2007).
50. Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing? Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction
Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 421–22 (2009) (“Thailand’s license on
Plavix drew particular attention from patent owners as the first step on a slippery slope towards
licensing any and all patents if heart disease were considered an emergency. . . . ‘Combating HIV
has always been seen by activists, if not others, as a health emergency, and under WTO rules,
patents can be broken in emergencies. However, it’s hard for anyone to argue that heart disease
meets such stringent tests.’”); and Andersen, supra note 46, at 107 (“When Thailand issued a
compulsory license in 2007, both the United States and the European Union condemned its actions, censuring the country and putting it on a ‘priority watch list.’”).
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reality in many states invoking compulsory licenses, can the same be said
for anthrax?
A potential test case for this question (and Article 31bis) could be Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR),51 manifesting TRIPS Article
31bis and authorizing Canada’s Commissioner of Patents to grant compulsory licenses permitting the manufacture and export of low-cost versions of
patented pharmaceuticals.52 Interestingly, one of the pharmaceuticals eligible for CAMR is 500mg oral Ciprofloxacin (Cipro)53—the subject of the
2001 dispute and exactly the drug and dose listed by the CDC as treatment
for Anthrax.54
The straightforward point here is that bioviolence exposes a flaw in the
TRIPS agreement’s compulsory licensing provisions: a compulsory license
may be issued only after a need for a particular product has been demonstrated. The system might work well enough regarding a disease like HIV/
AIDS that is a present and ongoing medical threat. However, in a way that
is unique from the role served by other medicines, bioviolence MCMs have
limited utility until a crisis when the need for them will be overwhelming.
Waiting until an attack to justify a compulsory license is too late, and will
inevitably result in suboptimal, unpredictable outcomes. The United States’
behavior following the anthrax attacks shows that, amid a bioviolence crisis, the patent protection system breaks down. This challenge of bioviolence
preparedness is an area that international law can usefully address now
before an attack, thereby encouraging producers to invest in new MCMs
while ensuring that bioviolence victims get what they need during an emergency. Still, prospects for progress in this context are less than promising.55
III.

FACILITATING MCM LICENSING

AND

EMERGENCY APPROVAL

It is in every nation’s interest to ensure that effective MCMs can be
expeditiously put to use wherever needed. Typically, however, medicines
may be dispensed only if licensed after thorough testing has demonstrated
51. Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, Introduction, http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/intro/
index_e.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
52. Norway, the Netherlands, India, Korea, China, and the EU have passed similarly directed
laws. CANADA’S ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME—CONSULTATION PAPER 2 n.5 (2006), available
at http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr_rcam_consult_e.pdf; see also Tsai, supra
note 48, at 1076 n.65.
53. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, Schedule 1 (1985).
54. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Patient Information: Ciprofloxacin 500-mg
Oral Tablet, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/treatment/cipropatient.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2009).
55. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has conducted negotiations toward
substantive harmonization of international intellectual property laws under the auspices of the
United Nations. However, these negotiations have not been generally successful, calling into question prospects for improving standards for compulsory licensing. Subhasis Saha, Patent Law and
TRIPS: Compulsory Licensing of Patents and Pharmaceuticals, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 364, 364–65 (2009).
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their safety and efficacy. Yet, many novel bioviolence MCMs have not
been elaborately tested. Moreover, many MCMs are licensed only in a few
developed nations. If an attack happens in a nation where an MCM is not
licensed, an official might insist on seeking clarification of the unlicensed
foreign MCM’s certification, delaying or prohibiting dispensation altogether. Notably, such officials are not limited to a nation’s licensing authority but may include officials (public or corporate) with authority to approve
an MCM’s transport and delivery as well as persons with local command
and control responsibility. Regardless of such persons’ position or motivation, the consequence of delay could be widespread illness and death.
While regulatory approval processes are expensive and time consuming for all pharmaceutical products,56 these challenges multiply in the context of biopreparedness. The international scope of such an initiative means
that producers must successfully navigate the procedures of many separate
regulatory regimes. Moreover, in the unique context of catastrophic disease
treatment, it may be necessary to allow for the emergency use of unapproved products or their unapproved uses. In a crisis situation, the best defense against an agent might be an MCM that has not yet been fully
approved.
This section’s simple assertion is that, at the moment of a bioviolence
crisis, the last thing anyone should do is argue about the legal status of
MCMs that can save lives or limit contagion’s spread. Nor should the beneficial use of one nation’s MCMs be restricted for use in a foreign nation due
to inconsistent regulatory approval. Such legal controversies should and can
be addressed now, in the pre-attack period of calm. Indeed, nothing discussed in this section poses an intractable problem; every issue raised here
can be resolved in advance through rational planning processes.
Nations could agree to recognize each others’ licensed MCMs if the
licensing nation has approved them using internationally recognized standards. Alternatively, amid an emergency, the receiving nation could grant
emergency use authorization (EUA). These two tactics basically differ by
timing: if the attack has not yet happened, a process of mutual recognition
of licensed MCMs is appropriate; if the attack has happened, then an EUA
process is appropriate. Despite the functional resemblance of these two tactics, it should be noted that international mechanisms to harmonize standards for licensing medicines already exist as will be discussed; they need
to be adjusted to specifically address bioviolence MCMs. By contrast, international harmonization mechanisms do not exist for EUAs; such mechanisms will need to be created.
56. “For a long time, pharmaceuticals have been among the most extensively regulated consumer products; in most countries, governments regulate testing, development, production, marketing and liability and often even control distribution and prices.” Kai P. Purnhagen, The
Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law—Is an International Drug Approval System
Modeled After the European System Worth Considering?, 63 Food DRUG L.J. 623, 624 (2008).
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A. Multi-National Harmonization of MCM Licensing Standards
Each sovereign nation must license MCMs for use in its jurisdiction.
Each State has developed its own procedures and requirements for such
licenses; the exact information required, risk accepted, and procedures followed may differ among them. The fact that different regulatory processes
invoke inconsistent standards for obtaining a license can be a disincentive
to MCM preparation.
International efforts to harmonize regulatory approval processes can
promote high standards and incentivize MCM development within a more
predictable, uniform regulatory environment. Moreover, the process of internationalizing approval standards evidences the priorities of participating
regulatory authorities. Finally, the more that pharmaceutical licensing
processes can be centralized, coordinated, and harmonized, the faster informed decisions can be made in the event of an emergency, when time is
of the essence and information may be fragmented. Notably, GHSAG’s recent interest in MCMs includes addressing regulatory issues related to
MCM licensing and distribution.57
Harmonization of standards for MCM regulatory approval is imperative. Standards should focus on quality control, staff, working areas, equipment and instruments, operating procedures, methods, reference materials,
reagents, control samples, documentation, biosafety, and audits. Pharmaceutical manufacturing plants are enormously expensive investments and
there are efficiencies to be gained by allowing such facilities to conform to
a single set of requirements in each of these areas. Disparate national regimes may force manufacturers to alter their production methods for individual markets, or worse, they may simply decide that select minority
markets are not worth pursuing.
Broadly viewed, there are two methods to address the need for consistent licensing standards and procedures. The first is through a system of
centralized licensing—consistency is promoted by virtue of there being one
authority with one set of rules. The second is for international/regional organizations to harmonize standards and procedures for national licensing,
thereby encouraging nations to recognize each other’s licensed MCMs.
1. Centralized Licensing
Centralized licensing means empowering an authoritative body to apply agreed-upon standards and issue internationally valid pharmaceutical
licenses. The WHO Prequalification Programme58 is a centralized approval
mechanism, originally designed to guide UN procurement agencies, that facilitates access to medicines that meet standards of quality, safety, and effi57. See Global Health Security Initiative, supra note 25.
58. World Health Organization, Prequalification of Medicines Programme, http://apps.who.
int/prequal/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
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cacy for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. The list of approved
products has evolved as a useful tool for purchasers of bulk medicines, including States and other organizations. For instance, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria disburses money for medicines that
the WHO process has prequalified.
In Europe, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) has a centralized approval process that allows the EMEA to
issue an approval decision on new applications that become binding across
the European Union. It is noteworthy that this mechanism has not been
favored by pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking licenses for European
distribution who seem to prefer to use EMEA’s alternative decentralized
model discussed below due to individual Member States’ larger, and therefore more predictable, bodies of law.59
Both the WHO and the EMEA systems have considerable merit. Yet,
the licensing of pharmaceutical products is widely understood as central to
State sovereignty, although States have ceded some sovereignty in the international public health context—the WHO, for example, is authorized to use
the territory of each Member as necessary to fulfill its objective and to
exercise its functions.60 A centralized licensing system for bioviolence
MCMs, therefore, should not be portrayed as wholly unrealistic. Yet, more
limited efforts at harmonization might be more realistic for now.
2. Mutual Recognition Based on Internationally Harmonized
Standards
A second method involves regulatory authorities recognizing approval
in a foreign jurisdiction and thereby granting certain exemptions in their
own jurisdictions. However, States are reluctant to turn over approval
processes to other States’ regulatory bodies due to concerns about the efficacy of certain States’ approval processes and different priorities relating to
side effects, testing procedures, and outcomes.
These concerns may be addressed through harmonization of standards.
Harmonization minimizes the differences among regulatory regimes, increasing the efficiency of applications and reviews based on consensus
principles. As States apply more consistent standards, they should be more
willing to accept results and decisions from other States. Among the reasons to promote harmonization are: (1) lowering new drug development
costs for pharmaceutical companies; (2) reducing the time to bring new
drugs to market; (3) increasing international cooperation in pharmaceutical
industry regulation, thus improving regulatory efficiency and expertise; and
(4) eliminating unnecessary duplication of clinical trials on human popula59. Purnhagen, supra note 56, at 635–36.
60. CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, art. 67, available at http://www.searo.
who.int/LinkFiles/About_SEARO_const.pdf.
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tions, thus minimizing risks to research subjects and assuaging ethical
concerns.61
An example of harmonization is Europe’s “decentralized procedure”
which establishes a licensing regime for mutual recognition.62 Companies
that obtain a license in an EU Member State may apply to another State for
mutual recognition of that authorization. The second State may refuse reciprocal authorization, but that triggers negotiation and, if not resolved,
mandatory and binding arbitration at the EMEA’s Committee on Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP).63 “Practically speaking, the result of the
decentralized procedure has been the near eradication of disputes regarding
mutual recognition as measured by referrals for CPMP arbitration.”64 The
decentralized procedure has essentially created a system of mutuality.
Developing bilateral and multilateral agreements among regulatory authorities can enable them to coordinate their efforts and offer recognition to
certain aspects of foreign approval processes. In the United States, the FDA
works for mutual recognition and international harmonization of regulatory
requirements and guidelines.65 Accordingly, the United States (FDA) and
Europe (EMEA) have taken some small steps to promote cooperation for
pharmaceutical licensing,66 including agreeing to mutual recognition of
Good Manufacturing Principles (GMP) inspections for pharmaceutical
manufacturers.67 The FDA and EMEA have also agreed to procedures for
the sharing of information, including post-authorization pharmacovigilance
61. J. John Lee, Comment, What Is Past Is Prologue: The International Conference on Harmonization and Lessons Learned from European Drug Regulations Harmonization, 26 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 151, 155 (2005); see Purnhagen, supra note 56 at 632–34.
62. Lee, supra note 61, at 175–77.
63. 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1; see generally European Medicines Agency, Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use, http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/general/contacts/CHMP/CHMP.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
64. Lee, supra note 61, at 176.
65. The FDA’s policy on developing international harmonization of regulatory requirements
and guidelines is intended to address how it participates with standards bodies outside of FDA,
domestic or international. The policy also covers the conditions under which FDA intends to use
the resultant standards, or other available domestic or international standards, in fulfilling its statutory mandates for safeguarding the public health. See Food and Drug Administration, International
Programs: Harmonization and Multilateral Relations, http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/
HarmonizationInitiatives/default.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). The FDA has also established
the Global Harmonization Task Force. See Food and Drug Administration, International Programs: Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/
HarmonizationInitiatives/ucm114616.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
66. Claudio A. Mereu and Philippe Delsaut, EMEA and the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals
Across the European Union, PHARMALICENSING.COM, http://pharmalicensing.com/public/articles/
view/994346010_3b44841a653f7 (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (suggesting that the EMEA is considering additional steps toward mutual recognition with the United States and others).
67. PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE, AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, http://
www.mac.doc.gov/mra/mra.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
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data, provided that the information is protected.68 Finally, the FDA and
EMEA (along with Japan) have taken significant strides toward harmonization through the ICH mechanism described below.
Coordination that is more broadly international could be promoted, for
example, through the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH). The ICH harmonizes national regulatory processes in Europe, Japan,
and the United States by producing a single set of technical requirements
for registering new drug products.69 Its objective is to ensure timelier introduction of new pharmaceuticals by reducing duplicative testing of new
medicines without compromising safety, quality, and efficacy.70 The ICH
has encouraged more countries to integrate their regulatory policies and is
extending harmonization efforts to advances in new medicines where increased regulatory cooperation can enhance the protection of international
public health.
There is also value in developing multilateral agreements among regulatory authorities to coordinate their efforts and offer recognition to foreign
approval processes. Such coordination could occur through networks for
regulatory authorities such as the WHO’s International Conference for Drug
Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA), a WHO-sponsored network that brings
together national regulatory authorities to, among other activities, harmonize regulatory processes.71 The WHO has also established the Developing
Countries’ Vaccine Regulators Network (DCVRN) to promote and support
the strengthening of national regulatory capacity for evaluation of clinical
68. Letter from Paul Weissenberg, Director, DG Enterprise European Commission and
Thomas Lonngren, Executive Director, European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, to Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Sept. 12, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/ConfidentialityCommitments/ucm093991.
htm; Letter from Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, to Paul
Weissenberg, Director, DG Enterprise European Commission and Thomas Lonngren, Executive
Director, European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (Sept. 12, 2003), http://
www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Agreements/ConfidentialityCommitments/ucm093989.htm.
69. International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/2834272-1.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
70. The ICH harmonization follows a five-step process. First, the ICH builds consensus
around a proposed harmonization contained in a Concept Paper. Second, the Steering Committee
signs off that there is sufficient scientific consensus on the technical issues for the draft guideline
or recommendation. Third, the guidelines become the subject of normal regulatory consultation in
three regions: the EU, Japan, and the United States. The parties share information gleaned from
these regional/national processes. Fourth, the ICH working group assesses these comments, and if
both regulatory and industry parties can be satisfied with a consensus guidelines, it is submitted to
the Steering Committee for adoption. The fifth step is regulatory implementation. National/regional regulatory processes in the EU, Japan, and the United States are engaged to adopt the
harmonized guidelines. See id.
71. See World Health Organization, International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities, http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/icdra/en/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
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trial proposals and clinical trial data through expertise and exchange of relevant information.72 The Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) also
serves as an information exchange forum for countries with developing
medical device regulatory systems.73
These international standards form the foundation for efforts to harmonize MCM production and acquisition processes, but to date, these standards do not specifically address the unique circumstances and
disincentives of producing bioviolence MCMs. These efforts should specifically support harmonization related to bioviolence MCM development.
B. Emergency Use Authorizations
To save lives following a bioviolence attack, unapproved MCMs that
are the best (and perhaps, only) preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic treatments for a given pathogen could be dispensed even though those MCMs
are not authorized for use in less critical times. A few countries have taken
steps to allow foreign MCMs to deal with emergency situations where no
authorized products are available. For example, Germany issued an ordinance in 2003 that allows the importation, storage, and use of non-licensed
drugs and vaccines.74
The absence of an internationally harmonized system to authorize
emergency use of unapproved MCMs or their unapproved (“off-label”)
uses, however, threatens to render them legally unusable in States that lack
an EUA mechanism.75 In a State having such a mechanism, it is unclear if it
is comparable to another State’s mechanism. Such confusion disincentivizes
MCM producers who need to know if their products will be used in an
emergency. Moreover, such confusion leaves responsible officials ruminating about the implications of authorizing unapproved MCMs just when
fast and appropriate decisions are most imperative.
72. See World Health Organization, Developing Countries’ Vaccine Regulators Network Establishment, http://www.who.int/immunization_standards/vaccine_regulation/dcvrn/en/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
73. “The Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) is a voluntary group of representatives
from national medical device regulatory authorities and . . . industry. . . . [GHTF’s] purpose is to
encourage convergence in regulatory practices related to ensuring the safety, effectiveness/performance and quality of medical devices, promoting technological innovation and facilitating international trade, and the primary way in which this is accomplished is via the publication and
dissemination of harmonized guidance documents on basic regulatory practices.” Global Harmonization Task Force, General Information, http://www.ghtf.org/information/information.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2009).
74. See Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, Germany: Enhancing International Capabilities for Responding to and Mitigating the Effects of Outbreaks of Diseases—How to Overcome Legal Problems, July 15, 2004,
available at http://www.opbw.org/new_process/mx2004/bwc_msp.2004_mx_wp07_E.pdf.
75. See Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of
Needed Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING INFECTION
DISEASES J. 1046, 1047–48, available at http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/7/pdfs/1046.pdf.
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Using the U.S.76 and European77 legal structures as models, the international community should work to harmonize EUAs worldwide. EUA harmonization provides predictability for industry and helps States align
priorities and cost-benefit analyses. International harmonization should address three issues: What is the process for EUA decision-making? What are
substantive decision-making standards? And, how should an authorization
be operationally implemented, including remediation and post-event withdrawal of an authorization?
1. EUA Process
Declaration of an emergency is requisite for considering EUAs.78 Accordingly, each State’s process for such declarations should be clear, and
harmonization of such processes would enable multi-national integration of
76. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 includes the Authorization for Medical Products for
Use in Emergencies that addresses the off-label use of approved products and the use of unapproved products for prevention, treatment, or diagnosis under emergency circumstances. Id. at
1048; see also Project BioShield Act § 4, 118 Stat. at 853–59 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3
(2006)). The FDA may approve the emergency use of drugs, devices, and medical products (including diagnostics) that were not previously approved, cleared, or licensed by FDA or the offlabel use of approved products in certain well-defined emergency situations. Project BioShield
Act § 4, 118 Stat. at 853–59. In addition to these statutory requirements, HHS, through ASPR, has
established the Secretary’s Emergency Use Authorization Working Group (EUA WG) which provides recommendations to the secretary and the FDA commissioner on use of EUAs, as well as
facilitates education and communication about EUAs with healthcare professionals and the public.
Nightingale et al., supra note 75, at 1048.
77. The legal foundation for emergency use of medicinal products in the European Community is addressed by two legal documents. First, EC Directive 2004/27 directs the Member States
to pass domestic legislation allowing for the temporary use of unauthorized medical products in
emergencies. 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34. It also specifies that such legislation must contain liability
immunity for manufacturers and healthcare providers. Id. EC directives are not binding at the
Community level but are expected to be transposed by each individual Member State. Second, EC
Regulation 507/2006 (binding on all citizens and Member States) allows the EU Committee for
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) to give certain products a conditional marketing
authorization during emergency situations. 2006 O.J. (L 92) 6. The legal basis for such a conditional marketing authorization stems from Article 14(7) of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004. Id.
78. In the United States, following the HHS secretary’s Declaration of a Public Health Emergency justifying issuance of the EUA, the FDA commissioner, under delegated authority from the
secretary of HHS, may issue an EUA after consultation, to the extent feasible and appropriate
given the circumstances of the emergency, with the directors of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and HHS/CDC, if she concludes that:
1) the secretary of Homeland Security determines there is a “domestic emergency, or a
significant potential for a domestic emergency, involving a heightened risk of attack
with a specified biological, chemical, radiologic, or nuclear agent or agents”; 2) the
secretary of defense determines that there is a similar emergency or potential emergency
threatening military forces; or 3) the secretary of HHS determines that there is a “public
health emergency under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act that affects, or has
a significant potential to affect, national security, and that involves a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents, or a specified disease or condition
that may be attributable to such agent or agents.”
Nightingale et al., supra note 75, at 1048. For further description and specific examples of recent
use, see Susan E. Sherman et al., Emergency Use Authority and 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 245 (2009).
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response. Such preplanning is essential if regions are relying on a shared
MCM stockpile strategy. Harmonized processes should specify types of information that could be relevant in the EUA context.79
The critical decision to approve a non-licensed MCM raises various
subsidiary questions. First, what will be the evidentiary burden of proof for
these decisions? Must a decision be beyond epidemiological or mathematical doubt, or simply based on a preponderance of available information? In
this context, what are an MCM producer’s obligations to furnish pertinent
documentation (under especially frenzied conditions), and what might be
the ramifications (liability) for producers who are later found to have withheld information? A parallel set of questions focus on the decision-maker:
under what standards will a decider be held accountable? If an application
is denied, is there a process for review or appeal? If so, how should procedural protections be modified to fit the urgency of an emergency authorization setting?
Perhaps the most important question in the international context concerns the evidentiary weight to be given to foreign States’ decisions to approve an EUA. Much bureaucratic effort and MCM producer uncertainty
could be alleviated by an internationally centralized mutual recognition system that allows a few (or just one) States’ approval to suffice for all. While
States do not routinely recognize extra-jurisdictional MCM approvals,
emergency situations might make States more amenable to recognition. Part
of emergency planning might include “emergency use recognition” provisions. Harmonization of procedures at the national level could facilitate
eventual consensus for a centralized approval mechanism, like the WHO
Prequalification Program (see above).
Mutual communication efforts should complement harmonization of
States’ EUA procedures. Regulatory authorities could develop information
sharing agreements regarding potential MCMs, standardizing lexicons, and
allowing for freer movement of information if an emergency is declared.
This should include analyses of the emergency use MCM’s efficacy and
side effects. Moreover, harmonized procedures can introduce transparency
with regard to the decision-making record, thereby reducing concerns of
perceived bias and help ensure the integrity of the decision-making process.
The FDA-EMEA Confidentiality Agreement suggests that States have already considered many of the legal and procedural issues related to information sharing and pharmaceutical licensing; similar agreements should be
developed specifically for the emergency use context.80
79. See Approval of New Drugs when Human Efficacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible,
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.600–650, 601.90–95; see also Christopher-Paul Milne, Racing the Globalization
of Infectious Diseases: Lessons from the Tortoise and the Hare, 11 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
1 (2004).
80. See Letter from Paul Weissenberg, supra note 68; see also Letter from Mark B. McClellan, supra note 68.
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2. Substantive Standards
Substantive standards for EUAs also require harmonization. In the
United States, an EUA is a determination (based on review of available
scientific studies) that an MCM’s benefits outweigh its potential risks (both
known and unknown), in addition to a demonstration that no alternative
product is available.81 In contrast, most nations’ regulatory authorities must
analyze many complicated issues by undertaking a de novo assessment of
the potential determinants and by defining, again de novo, the metrics for
deciding whether a specific determinant is satisfied. It would be useful,
therefore, to have international guidance for specific determinants and the
metrics for assessing those determinants in particular cases. The following
list could be helpful in that context:
1. What is the magnitude of the threat in terms of the pathogen’s lethality, contagiousness, and proximity to the relevant
population? If the unapproved MCM is not used, what will be
the likely magnitude of harm?
2. What is the timeframe for that threat—is it a clear and present danger? Within the relevant timeframe, is there more information that could be obtained that would likely produce a
more informed judgment about the threat or about the proposed MCM?
3. What are the potential consequences associated with using
the unauthorized MCM? How do these consequences compare to the consequences of not using it? Are there any alternatives to the use of the unapproved MCM? Should the same
standards apply to unlicensed MCMs and off-label use of licensed MCMs?
4. Can the consequences of using the unapproved MCM be lessened by a refined dissemination strategy (e.g., not dispensing
to persons who are immune-compromised or to young children)? What are the implications of dispensing the MCM to
specific groups (e.g., first responders or the military) instead
of the general population?
81. In the United States, following the HHS secretary’s Declaration of Emergency justifying
issuance of the EUA, the FDA commissioner, under delegated authority from the secretary of
HHS, may issue an EUA after consultation, to the extent feasible and appropriate given the circumstances of the emergency, with the directors of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
CDC, if she concludes that:
1) the agent listed in the emergency declaration can cause a serious or life-threatening
disease or condition; 2) on the basis of the totality of scientific evidence available, including data from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available, it is reasonable to believe that the medical product may be effective in diagnosing, treating or
preventing this disease or condition or a serious or life-threatening disease or condition
caused by another EUA-authorized product or an otherwise approved or licensed product; 3) the known and potential benefits of the medical product, when used to diagnose,
prevent, or treat the disease or condition, outweigh the risks, both known and potential;
and 4) no adequate, approved, alternative medical product is available.
Nightingale et al., supra note 75, at 1048.
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5. Is the proposed MCM available in sufficient quantities? What
will be the expense and logistical challenges associated with
getting it to needed populations? Can this be done within an
acceptable timeframe?
3. Operational Implementation
Operational matters subsequent to approval should be precisely
planned and standardized. At least three phases of implementation deserve
attention here: proper MCM use; recordkeeping; and remediation.
First, any emergency use law must require clear communication of the
prescribed methods of use to response personnel or health care workers who
will dispense the MCMs. They may need information on how to handle,
store, and administer an unfamiliar product. They should also receive sufficient information to inform recipients of both their right of refusal (if any)
and the product information necessary to make that decision. If there are
restrictions on authorized use, that information must also be communicated
to both dispensers and recipients.82
Second, States must maintain detailed records about the MCM’s administration. Data about recipients of an MCM must be meticulously
logged to track its side effects and its treatment efficacy. Similarly, recordkeeping allows administrators to communicate with recipients in order to
adjust dosages, monitor recipients’ pre-existing conditions, or advise them
regarding subsequent changes in their health. Data should enter a feedback
loop informing decision makers faced with new decisions or reviewing past
ones, allowing them to revoke their designation if the products prove more
dangerous or less effective than originally thought. 83
Third, emergency authorization mechanisms should also consider
remediation measures such as identifying and distributing a product that can
treat an MCM’s negative side effects. MCM EUAs should also include capacity for withdrawing approval either because the threat has dissipated or
because the MCM is less effective or creates more harmful side effects than
originally thought. Withdrawing emergency authorization may simply require the reverse process of authorization to issue a corresponding revocation. Initial authorizations may facilitate this by including “sunset”
provisions that automatically revoke an authorization after a set period of
time unless formally renewed.
IV. PLANNING

FOR

MCM STOCKPILING

AND

DELIVERY

MCMs are valuable only if they get to bioviolence victims when
needed. The essence of preparedness, therefore, is stockpiling of sufficient
82. Note that the CFR provides for exceptions and alternatives to the standard FDA labeling
requirements for MCMs in the Strategic National Stockpile. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.26 (2007).
83. Nightingale et al., supra note 75, at 1049.
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MCMs and rapid delivery, most likely across national boundaries as few
nations have in-country vaccine manufacturers, and most likely during a
period of mass panic.
These challenges must be confronted in a time frame that is measured
in minutes. Envision, for example, dissemination of weaponized anthrax in
a sports arena, infecting perhaps thousands of victims. The white powder
must be collected and transported to a diagnostic facility for analysis; once
confirmed as anthrax, producers of vaccine and antibiotics must accelerate
production; those MCMs must then be transported to a cargo plane that will
transport them perhaps thousands of miles to the target site where they must
dispensed to victims. All this must happen within less than 72 hours.
Outside perhaps two dozen countries in the world, meeting this deadline is
pure fantasy.
It should be noted that stockpiling of medicines, particularly vaccines
against chronic diseases, is not unprecedented. For example, the WHO’s
International Coordination Group (ICG) stockpiles vaccines for yellow fever, meningitis, polio, and avian flu (H5N1)84 and expert consultations are
underway for stockpiling vaccines against the new H1N1 influenza.85
Moreover, the GAVI Alliance (formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunisation) stockpiles medicines against pneumococcal disease,
rotavirus, and yellow fever.86 While for a host of reasons these medicine
stockpiling systems are not ideal analogues for a system of bioviolence
MCM preparedness, they do offer some useful insights.
This section addresses MCM stockpile planning before turning to delivery planning.
A. MCM Stockpile Planning
Stockpiling is the epitome of planning. With unlimited resources, every
nation should stockpile enough MCMs for its population, but domestic
stockpiling of MCMs is inefficient and unrealistic for most nations. Instead,
MCM stockpiling should be regional, where depots can be connected to
transport systems that can move resources rapidly to where they are
needed.87 Key to regional stockpiling is detailed allocation arrangements
84. See World Health Organization, Informal Consultation on Technical Specifications for a
(WHO) International H5N1 Vaccine Stockpile, Oct 17, 2007, http://www.who.int/vaccine_research/diseases/influenza/181007_agenda_octobre.pdf.
85. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, RESPONDING TO THE AVIAN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
THREAT (2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_
CDS_CSR_GIP_05_8-EN.pdf.
86. GAVI Alliance, New and Underused Vaccines, http://www.gavialliance.org/vision/policies/new_vaccines/index.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
87. In the United States, the Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project (VMBIP)
represents the efforts of the CDC, state and local immunization program managers, and partner
agencies to improve current vaccine management processes at the federal, state, and local levels.
VMBIP has determined that centralized distribution of vaccine from two or three locations is
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specifying priorities that minimize disputes or confusion during an emergency. With regard to stockpiling responsibilities (including States’ obligations to contribute to stockpile contents), and equitable distribution and
reservation of stockpiled MCMs depending on an attack’s location and severity, the following critical choices deserve consideration:
1. Whether to rely on physical stockpiling versus surge capacity
when an attack has been identified. In order to allow for rapid
production of large volumes of product, surge capacity requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to sustain expert personnel and excess manufacturing capacity, as well as flexible
drug “scaffolds” that provide a pharmaceutical base for assembling multiple pathogen-specific responses. In the United
States, HHS awarded contracts to expand manufacturing
surge capacity for pandemic influenza vaccines and certain
other MCMs.88 However, most States lack a domestic MCM
industry, let alone one with excess capacity for producing
MCMs.89 To the extent that surge production is preferred, the
international community should encourage investments in
scaffolding technologies.
2. Whether to develop Push Packages or rely on Vendor-Managed Inventories. Push Packages are government-owned
caches of supplies and medications, located in secure locations. Vendor-Managed Inventories (VMIs) are maintained in
reserve by private vendors; governments may purchase them
as needed. Typically, VMIs contain frequently used products
that vendors can rotate to maintain shelf life.
3. How to locate stockpiles with optimal access to major cities
and targets and proximity to transnational transportation networks. These determinations require the application of general planning principles to threat and capacity assessments
individualized for each State or region.
In addition to these determinants, stockpile planning should focus on
maintaining stockpile surety and security. Surety refers to the proper storage
and maintenance of stockpile assets. Because MCMs spoil with time, storpreferred to multiple state and local depots; centralization reduces storage risks and distribution
costs and allows more visibility into vaccine supply. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vmbip/default.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
88. See HHS Press Office, HHS Awards Contracts Totaling More Than $1 Billion To Develop Cell-Based Influenza Vaccine, May 4, 2006, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/
20060504.html; see also BARDA MCM Progress: HHS PHEMCE Stakeholders Workshop, Arlington, VA, Sept. 24, 2008, available at https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/documents/080924barda-mcmprogress.pdf.
89. A lack of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing affects less developed nations’ ability
to produce even basic lifesaving medicines. Nations with such dire infrastructure problems will
hardly be expected to make MCM production a priority. See Roger Bate, Local Pharmaceutical
Production in Developing Countries, Jan. 2008, available at http://www.fightingdiseases.org/pdf/
local_drug_production.pdf.
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age of MCMs must satisfy unique environmental requirements such as temperature, moisture, and light. They must also be kept up to date to avoid the
distribution of expired products. International surety standards should be
incorporated into the international stockpiling guidelines and international
stockpile agreements.90 Relevant here are the WHO’s Guidelines on the
International Packaging and Shipping of Vaccines, including the Model
Quality Assurance System for Assessment of Procurement Agencies that
provides guidance for pharmaceutical storage and distribution.91 The
WHO’s model system focuses on training, adequate storage, and sanitation
including temperature and volume standards, stock rotation, safe transportation, compliance with labeling and insulated packaging standards, and
maintenance of accurate and complete records.92
Security concerns are also important. Attack perpetrators might try to
destroy MCM stockpiles, or panicked victims of an attack might assault the
stockpile. Determinations about the best security options are likely to be
nation-specific and depend on a given force’s training, availability, and reliability.93 Here again, planning is critical, including the following elements:
• providing law enforcement and fire control
• safeguarding and controlling access to restricted areas
• maintaining vehicle traffic control
• facilitating orderly entrance to and exit from the point of distribution (POD)
• providing crowd control within and outside of the POD
• maintaining command-and-control capability for security staff
• coordinating intra-POD security operations as well as security
operations between PODs and local law enforcement
90. See, e.g., WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR VACCINE BANKS (2008), available at http://www.oie.int/Eng/Normes/Mmanual/
2008/pdf/1.1.10_VACCINE_BANKS.pdf.
91. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF VACCINES AND BIOLOGICALS, GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL PACKAGING AND SHIPPING OF VACCINES (2001), available at http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF99/www9942.pdf; and WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, MODEL QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM FOR ASSESSMENT OF PROCUREMENT AGENCIES (2007), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/ModelQualityAssurance.pdf.
92. See GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL PACKAGING AND SHIPPING OF VACCINES, supra
note 91.
93. In the United States, a combatant command within the U.S. military has been tasked with
estimating necessary troop and resource requirements for distribution site security, yet the capability is not yet operational. If the SNS is deployed, each state is responsible for providing security
for the SNS assets and distribution sites once they assume custody of the counter-measures. Under
the 2004 version of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13, federal law enforcement (through
DHS and DOJ) may provide “protection of personnel and temporary storage facilities during the
distribution of supplies from the SNS.” DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (2004), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps56895/NRP_FullText.pdf.
However, the most recent version of ESF #13, dated January 2008, does not discuss SNS security.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #13—Public Safety and
Security Annex (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-13.pdf.
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• coordinating facility parking and ensuring adequate water,
sanitation services, and heating or air conditioning, as
required.
Altogether, States should be encouraged to develop cooperative stockpiling arrangements with neighbors. International organizations should promulgate guidelines that serve as bases for multi-national stockpile
agreements and help build capacity for achieving relevant benchmarks. Development of an international certification or a peer-review process for
stockpile surety and security would be useful for specifying metrics that can
be used for evaluating national plans. An example here is the WHO’s International Coordinating Group (ICG) on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic
Meningitis Control, which makes national distribution planning a requirement of participation.94 Plans for MCM stockpiling should be re-assessed
regularly, considering changing threat parameters, manufacturing capabilities, and new science regarding potential agents and countermeasures.
In this context, the planning for an international H5N1 vaccine stockpile is informative. Recognizing that having an international stockpile available at the start of a pandemic helps ensure that people initially in greatest
need would benefit from treatment with antiviral drugs, the WHO plans to
establish an international stockpile of antiviral drugs for rapid response at
the start of a pandemic,95 and it has urged countries to have a stockpile of
drugs for aggressively fighting the disease and preventing a pandemic outbreak.96 Critical determinants that have been identified include logistics associated with deployment and administration, licensing for use in individual
countries, epidemiological triggers for deploying the stockpile, mass delivery mechanisms, and time frames for emergency delivery and
administration.97
B. MCM Delivery Planning
Distribution planning requires assigning responsibilities for triggering
the delivery of stockpiled MCMs. A model international distribution plan
should identify the types of authorities that are necessary and suggest levels
of decision makers who should be involved in such decisions.98 Also, au94. World Health Organization, International Coordinating Group (ICG) on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic Meningitis Control, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/meningococcal/icg/en (last
visited Oct. 24, 2009).
95. World Health Organization, Informal Consultation, supra note 84.
96. Aditi Diya Nag, The Bird Flu and the Invoking of TRIPS Article 31 “National Emergency” Exception, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 689, 703 (2007).
97. WHO is working closely with groups engaged in mathematical modeling to develop early
containment strategies. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 85, at 11.
98. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ANNEX 5—SUGGESTED PREEVENT PLANNING ACTIVITIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES (2003), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/annex-5.pdf; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/smallpox/response-plan/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
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thority needs to be assigned for selecting transportation methods to get
stockpiled assets to the dispensation sites. International logistical organizations have powerful capabilities that could be useful in response to an act of
bioviolence.99
Planners must also develop contingent plans for estimating what public
and private assets and personnel will participate. Dedicated vehicles and
equipment should carry MCMs, whether public civilian assets, military assets, or private assets. Use of military assets and personnel brings its own
set of legal obstacles (e.g., posse comitatus) and similarly requires planning
and training for this uncommon mission. Mobilizing public assets requires
legal provision to re-assign vehicles, equipment and personnel. Commandeering or otherwise employing private assets also requires legal authorization. Even if the logistical plans identify public and/or private assets,
personnel must be trained to protect and maintain the MCMs in the challenging circumstances of a bioviolence emergency.
Notably, the WHO Good Distribution Practices for Pharmaceutical
Products addresses pharmaceutical distribution, recognizing that States employ different distribution models. Guidance addresses: organization and
management; personnel; quality management; warehousing and storage; vehicles and equipment; containers and container labeling; dispatch; transportation and products in transit; documentation; repackaging and relabeling;
complaints; recalls; rejected and returned products; counterfeit pharmaceutical products; importation; contract activities; and self-inspection.100 In order to identify vulnerabilities in States’ plans and promote confidence that
States appreciate their responsibilities, this and other international mechanisms should be developed to evaluate national distribution plans, provide
technical and financial assistance to national delivery authorities, and build
linkages with the private sector.
This section focuses on the following key issues: (1) command and
control responsibilities for MCM delivery; (2) stockpile dispensation; and
(3) mandatory dispensation of MCMs.
1. Command and Control Planning
Command and control is critical to responding to a bioviolence attack.
Accordingly, national response plans should address: hierarchies amongst
would-be decision-makers; the powers delegated to each; command, control, and information systems that conform to that distribution of responsibilities; and training for all participants to perform their roles under
99. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) specializes in providing air, water, and
land transportation capabilities including rapid response, and deploys Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITES) to carry out these responsibilities. See United Nations
World Food Programme, Logistics, http://www.wfp.org/logistics (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
100. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GOOD DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 3 (2005), http://www.health.gov.il/download/forms/a3040_GDP.pdf.
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pressure.101 Command and control may also benefit from using operations
centers that sustain situational awareness and a common operating picture,
and facilitate information sharing between public health and law
enforcement.
The variability of possible bio-events requires combining macro-level
situational awareness and resources with micro-level execution. As central
authorities typically have the most comprehensive situational awareness
and can draw on the highest level of planning expertise, they can most efficiently allocate resources for distribution activities. Yet local authorities
know the local geography, transportation routes, and available personnel;
their control of distribution activities allows for nimble and precise responses that are tailored to their own circumstances. Thus, the coordination
benefits of centralization must be balanced with the flexibility and local
knowledge of decentralized approaches. Operational command and control
should, therefore, connect local authorities with national and international
officials and ensure that all decision-makers have effective legal authority.
2. Specifying Conditions for Stockpile Dispensation
States should be legally obliged and capable of making fine-grained
decisions: how many of each MCM/asset should be deployed? How should
shortages be handled? What happens if plans fall short of expectations?
States also must ensure that officials and private persons execute their relevant responsibilities properly.
Lessons can be learned from the WHO’s ICG Process for Stockpiling
and Delivery of Vaccines. An emergency stockpile of vaccines, bundled
with its injection materials and antibiotics, are held at the manufacturer’s
storage facilities.102 The stocks can be requested by any country facing an
epidemic; decisions are based on the epidemiological situation, pre-existing
stocks in the country, intervention strategy, local coordination and operational aspects of the epidemic response, and how much of the particular
vaccine is available.103 Each nation must provide necessary information;
101. In the United States, HSPD-8 calls for the creation of comprehensive training programs
for first responders and directs HHS and other federal departments and agencies to establish a
single point of access to federal preparedness assistance information; the actual assistance is typically deployed through state governments. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National
Preparedness, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1822 (Dec. 17, 2003). The DHS Office of Grants and
Training (G&T) provides specialized training to enhance the capacity of first responders to deal
specifically with terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. A major program within the
Office of G&T is the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) that identifies, develops, tests, and delivers training to state and local emergency responders. It includes the Center for
Domestic Preparedness, as well as several state institutions. See National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium, http://www.ndpc.us/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
102. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATING GROUP ON VACCINE PROVISION FOR EPIDEMIC MENINGITIS CONTROL (ICG), GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING TO THE EMERGENCY STOCKPILE 2 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/meningococcal/ICG_guidelines_2008_02_09.pdf.
103. Id. at 2–3.
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prepare an action plan for the mass vaccination campaign and reimburse the
cost of goods shipped, including transport freight and insurance.104 Vaccines that are used should be restocked before the end of the calendar year
so that the total amount of annual stockpile is available for use in preventive
campaigns in countries identified by WHO and UNICEF as being at high
risk for the epidemic.105
With regard to bioviolence MCM dispensation, there are two leading
tactics corresponding to the requisite method of delivery. Countermeasures
that require injection or other specialized administration would likely be
administered at a central point of distribution (POD). Other MCMs, such as
oral antibiotics to combat anthrax, are capable of self-administration and
could be delivered by postal workers or other decentralized means. The
scale or severity of an outbreak is relevant to this decision.
POD sites should be stocked based on the estimated number of people
to be treated. A 2008 RAND study laid out considerations for POD number
and location, based on the per-POD throughput, characteristics of the community such as travel distance and population density, and trade-offs between minimizing and equalizing travel distances and deploying equalsized PODs.106 In addition, there should be medical supplies for dispensing
MCMs and other assets needed for crowd control, communication, and
emergency response.107 Delivery plans should provide guidance for each
potential pathogen/MCM combination.
MCMs that can be self-administered could be delivered by postal
workers or other decentralized means. Indeed, according to a 2008 National
Academies of Science (NAS) report, an emergency medical POD structure
will have to contend with an abnormally large rate of throughput.108 The
NAS highlighted the potential of “push” mechanisms that would deliver
104. Id. at 3.
105. See GAVI ALLIANCE INTERIM ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT: GAVI YELLOW FEVER VACCINE STOCKPILE 1 (2004), available at http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/13th_brd_Yellow_
fever_stockpile_2.pdf.
106. The study recommends that all PODs meet the minimum requirements in the CDC’s
Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets: A Guide for
Preparedness. See RAND HEALTH, RECOMMENDED INFRASTRUCTURE STANDARDS FOR MASS ANTIBIOTIC DISPENSING 1 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/
RAND_TR553.pdf. Jurisdictions should consider a “rapid-dispensing protocol” to minimize the
need for medically-licensed personnel at the POD site. Id. at xviii. Such a protocol would cover
the following functions: “(i) directing clients through the POD; (ii) deciding which medication to
dispense; (iii) disseminating information about the medication; and (iv) dispensing the medication.” Id. Plans should address preferred administration mechanisms and contingency plans in the
event of complications. Id.
107. Such supplies might include surgical gloves, gowns, masks, respirators, needles and syringes, and public address systems. See Stephen Adams, Deputy Director, Strategic National
Stockpile, Influenza A (H1N1) Update Meeting, U.S. Strategic National Stockpile: Strategies for
Influenza Mitigation (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.intramed.net/UserFiles/archivos/
H1N1/steven_adams.pdf.
108. INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, DISPENSING MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 12 (2008).
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countermeasures to individuals as part of a layered strategy to reach large
numbers of people quickly and allow residents to shelter in place if there
are environmental risks.109 The report recommends types of public-private
partnerships in this arena.110
National plans for rapidly dispensing stockpile contents in an emergency should engage the private sector in providing surge capacity, vendor
managed inventories, and transportation assets.111 Planning should include
information technology necessary for maintaining and accessing medical
records of persons who have received treatment. This is helpful—especially
in emergencies—for tracking treatment success, location, and side effects,
for avoiding hoarding, and for tracking the phases of a multi-phase
treatment.
3. Mandatory Dispensation of MCMs?
A bioviolence attack will likely entail an extremely dangerous disease
for which highly specific equipment and professionally trained first responders are needed. For purposes of dispensing MCMs, teams of first responders should be specifically prepared to address the unique problems of
intentional outbreaks. Consideration should be given to pre-attack vaccination for first responders who will not have time to get vaccinated, much less
to wait for the vaccine to take effect once an event occurs. Vaccination
would assure responders that they are not jeopardizing their own health by
109.
110.
•
•
•

Id. at 11.
The recommended types of partnerships include:
Coordinating logistics, warehousing, and distribution of countermeasures.
Setting up open points of dispensing (PODs) for dispensing countermeasures.
Setting up closed PODs, usually by large employers for their employees and their
families, thereby decreasing the volume of people at open PODs.
• Providing temporary labor to staff PODs and perform many other functions.
• Training and screening of volunteers.
• Preregistering individuals to screen for adverse health effects.
• Tracking and registering people who receive countermeasures.
• Providing education and communication for recipients of countermeasures.
• Providing security for open or closed PODs.
• Conducting research and development for new medical countermeasures.
• Providing technical assistance to private organizations to help them establish PODs.
Id. at 21.
111. In the United States, localities must submit distribution plans to the CDC, covering the
public health department’s coordination with traditional and nontraditional community partners;
receiving, staging, and distributing medical materiel; laws to aid in the rapid dispensing of medications; and types and frequency of training, exercising, and evaluation of response plans. CDC
reviews the plans annually. CDC works closely with localities to help identify and fix planning
vulnerabilities and to test their capabilities through exercises. In doing so, CDC relies on a study
prepared for the HHS Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response (ASPR), which recommends a point-of-dispensation plan with the following five stages: (1) orientation and paperwork;
(2) registration; (3) medical assessment; (4) vaccination; and (5) form collection and exit. The
U.S. government can usefully adapt this system to promote international dispensation capacities.
See RAND HEALTH, supra note 106. These plans are in addition to the states’ response plans,
reviewed and tested by FEMA under Presidential Decision Directive 39. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
DIRECTIVE 39, U.S. POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORISM (June 21, 1995).
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assisting. However, there are many potential agents to be vaccinated
against, and vaccines can have potentially serious side effects. Therefore, a
program of pre-attack vaccination for first responders must be accompanied
by clear guidelines of the risks involved including data on which populations may have heightened risk.
Plans should also provide guidance on preparation of medical personnel for mass countermeasure administration, specifying the appropriate
number of staff at each dispensation site. A 2008 RAND study recommends
that jurisdictions be required to identify “core staff” in advance, leaving
auxiliary personnel to be recruited ad hoc or borrowed from other government agencies or community organizations.112 As discussed previously, legal provisions should be in place to address potential liability arising from
the treatments.
A different problem pertains to dispensation of MCMs to the general
population: what should be done about an individual who refuses to take
them? That refusal may intolerably endanger others around him, raising a
tension between public safety and individual liberties. During an outbreak,
authorities will have little time to discuss the issue, much less engage in a
protracted legal process to authorize mandatory administration of MCMs.
The fact that various nations resolve these questions differently can impede
a multinational response.
In planning for persons refusing treatment, States might consider offering a choice: accept medical intervention or be quarantined. In other words,
temporarily forfeit control over one’s body or liberty. Due process concerns
may arise if officials are authorized to determine that someone who refuses
inspection or treatment ought to be quarantined. States and international
organizations should be encouraged to develop national plans for such compulsory interventions.
CONCLUSION
The obstacles to a functioning global infrastructure for bioviolence
MCM preparedness in the near future are legion. Naysayers could readily
rattle off dozens of reasons why this or that initiative will not work, and
they are right. As already mentioned, the world is remarkably dysfunctional, and implementation of progressive reform in this context faces nearinfinite obstructions and frustrations. Moreover, there is scant evidence that
global leaders consider such an infrastructure to be among their highest
priorities.
The purpose of this article, however, has not been to assess the political odds that such an infrastructure will be built soon; it has been to draw a
map of that infrastructure. For the moment, therefore, it is useful to shelve
snide political realism and try to envision what a legally constituted global
112. RAND HEALTH, supra note 106, at 45.
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infrastructure for bioviolence MCM preparedness would look like. Significantly, necessary reforms require neither substantial expense nor drastic legal restructuring.
First, there would be an international panel or task force comprised of
experts and serving a role broadly analogous to that of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, that: develops consensus criteria of risk; identifies existing MCMs for reducing those risks; resolves externalities
associated with those MCMs; and promotes research and development of
new risk reduction MCMs. This panel or task force would strive to harmonize research lexicons as it engages the best scientific and technical expertise worldwide. Because at least part of its focus will be on international
threats, this panel or task force will need to have some connection to global
law enforcement (Interpol, perhaps), in addition to science and public
health communities. Its determinations, while not binding, will be the bases
of all decisions throughout the MCM preparedness system, even as those
decisions evolve over time.
Second, there would be widespread efforts to harmonize relevant national legislation concerning: liabilities of private pharmaceutical developers for the adverse consequences of their MCMs; mutual recognition of
licensed MCMs and harmonized criteria for emergency use authorizations;
transportation and distribution of MCMs in the wake of a bio-attack; and
harmonized procedures for incorporating MCMs into effective response
planning. While nations need not implement identical laws, each nation
should have laws that address relevant issues, and outright inconsistencies
and gaps within a State’s own laws should be corrected. The oversight role
of the United Nations Security Council in this regard could be pivotal.113
Third, some international organizations would adapt and accelerate
key programs and initiatives. The WHO is pivotal in this context; fortunately, much of what the WHO would be expected to accomplish is already
more or less in place. Notably, to address patent protections, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should be engaged, and to address harmonization of licensing standards, the ICH should be engaged.
There is no apparent need for a new international bureaucracy as much as
there is a need to encourage a handful of existing international organizations to cooperate more effectively, specifically focusing on the challenges
of bioviolence preparedness.
To conclude on a pessimistic note, it may be easier to envision political support for a global bioviolence MCM preparedness infrastructure to
address the second catastrophic bio-attack. After one truly cataclysmic use
of disease for hostile purposes, States’ commitment and energy will un113. Although far beyond this article’s scope, there is the useful precedent of UNSCR 1540
which obligates every nation to implement laws for preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction to non-State actors. Barry Kellman, Criminalization and Control of WMD Proliferation: The Security Council Acts, 11 THE NONPROLIFERATION REV. 142, 142–43 (2004).
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doubtedly rise to implement the appropriate legal modalities upon which a
preparedness infrastructure can promote security against a repeat assault.
Yet, in light of the potential magnitude of harm that bioviolence could
cause, it may be suggested that the world not wait to prepare for the second
attack. We should prepare now.

